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Cognition is Recognition: Literary  
Knowledge and Textual “Face”
James Simpson
O
ur language for the truths of literature is reformist and 
nominalist; our experience of reading is, by contrast, habitual 
and idealist. Contrary to the way critics talk about what kind 
of new, liberatory truths literature expresses, our actual reading prac-
tice is grounded in long-standing forms of recognition. Every time we 
interpret we recall deep-seated, ingrained, and circular protocols that 
give us access to truths immanent within the separate realms of literary 
experience. As interpreters, we depend on préjugés that produce recog-
nition of already existing truths. 
Such, at any rate, is the thesis of this essay. That literary knowledge 
is thus Janus-faced, looking resolutely forward even as it draws deep on 
a backward gaze, is in no way contradictory or disabling. The deepest 
posture of Anglo-American literary pedagogy is grounded, rightly, on 
the conviction that literature liberates. We prize what is new, what de-
stabilizes the solidities of official culture, and what points to liberation 
from the strictures of the norm. We also prize the individuality of each 
work, partly because we prize individuality and partly because we need 
the business: as long as each work, and, more recently, each material 
text of each work, is distinct, there’s work in it for us. The current essay 
is in no way designed to undo these Enlightenment-derived convictions 
about liberation from the past or to question these perfectly reasonable 
business necessities. 
I am, however, concerned to show that our reading practice is dif-
ferently grounded, on opposed premises. Our reading practice, that is, 
depends on deeply instilled norms and begins by assuming that every 
work in a certain genre is the “same” work, a work that we “knew” be-
fore we began reading the “new” work. Literary knowledge, that is, is 
dependent on recognition. We know because we knew. Literary cogni-
tion is fundamentally a matter of re-cognition.
This default position for reading is certainly at odds with any revo-
lutionary pedagogic program that prizes originality and pure novelty, 
wholly freed from the strictures of the past. The default practice of new literary history 26
“recognitional” reading proposed here is not, however, at odds with a 
reformist and a nominalist interpretation of a work, since the recogni-
tions of literary experience are not instances of mere repetition; on the 
contrary, the literary recognitions we care about are memorable because 
we see a truth—we know the place, we see a face—as for the first time, 
and as unique. The recognition is old and general; the force of the rec-
ognition is reformist and very particular. When Dante first sees Beatrice 
at the summit of purgatory, at the very moment he must abandon Virgil 
as a guide, he makes a recognition both personal and literary: “cognosco 
i segni del’antica fiamma” (Purgatorio 30.48),1 he declares, citing Dido’s 
“agnosco veteris vestigia flammae” (Aeneid 4.23).2 Dante’s recognition is 
expressed in terms of the old, the dying, and the universally available; 
the force of that recognition is, by contrast, powerfully revivifying, pain-
fully reformist, and unique to Dante.3 
The old, the dying, and the general are, that is, the very conditions of 
the revivification, the reform, and the unique application. An abiding 
literary canon is never therefore obsolete, since it remains fresh for every 
generation of new readers. Informed conversation with a recognized 
past, central to the entire tradition of liberal education since antiquity, 
is the condition of reformist movement into the future. 
I
My case is clearly about the practice of literary reading itself. I begin, 
nonetheless, with a literary example in which represented recognitions 
occupy a very high profile. I begin thus precisely in order to give a strong 
instance of why revolutionaries (as distinct from reformists) might not 
prize recognition. I start with scenes of recognition in a short English 
romance of the early fourteenth-century, Sir Orfeo. Such scenes are grist 
for the mill of those who would dismiss recognition as the sign of the 
manipulatively ideological old order. Such dismissal resisted, I go on to 
use this narrative example to craft a model for interpretive recognition. 
The early fourteenth-century romance known as Sir Orfeo narrates the 
story of Pluto’s capture, and Orfeo’s recuperation, of Orfeo’s queen 
Eurydice. Asleep under a fruit tree one May day at noon, Eurydice 
wakens and lacerates herself, having been told in her sleep that she will 
be collected the following day and taken to the underworld kingdom of 
Pluto. That day having come, Eurydice vanishes from within a protective 
military guard. Orfeo immediately renounces his crown, appoints his 
steward as king, and quits his kingdom, sparely dressed and equipped 
only with his harp. For ten years he lives, winter and summer, unprotected 27 cognition is recognition
in the forest, providing solace with his harp to animals alone. Often he 
observes the train of Pluto the king of Faerie, but one day in particular 
he follows a group of “faerie” women as they dance in the forest. He 
and his wife recognize each other: Orfeo “yerne [penetratingly] beheld 
hire and she him eke / But neither to other a word ne speke” (323–34).4 
They separate for a second time, but Orfeo follows the troop through 
a rock into a splendid underworld at whose center stands an intricate, 
brilliant castle. Orfeo gains entry by promising to harp for the court, 
but once admitted, sees the paralyzed inhabitants of the castle, all in 
fixed postures and many disabled, along with many wives captured as 
they slept at noon. Amongst these women he recognizes his own wife. 
Orfeo performs beautifully on his harp before the court of Pluto, who, 
deeply touched by his playing, offers whatever gift the minstrel should 
choose. Orfeo requests the gift of Eurydice, but is denied by Pluto on 
the grounds of the disparity of his ugliness and Eurydice’s beauty. A 
thing yet more ugly, Orfeo replies, would be a promise broken by the 
king. Pluto recognizes the force of this argument and delivers Eurydice. 
Returned to his own city, Orfeo leaves his wife in the poor cottage 
where he had taken refuge, and enters the city in disguise as a beggar 
minstrel. He is received by the steward and permitted to play before 
the court. The steward recognizes Orfeo’s harp; he weeps profusely on 
hearing from the unrecognized Orfeo that the harp was found in the 
forest ten years ago, beside a dead man lacerated by lions. On seeing 
the steward’s tears for the imagined loss of Orfeo, the beggarly minstrel 
declares that if he were in fact King Orfeo returned, he would recognize 
the fidelity of his steward and nominate him as successor. At this point 
all recognize their king returned (“alle tho that therinne sete / That 
this was Orfeo underyete [understood]” [lines 579–80]). The steward 
pushes the table over and falls at Orfeo’s feet. Orfeo is washed and 
shaven. Eurydice is fetched from the outskirts of the town, and they 
reappear as king and queen, accompanied by much minstrelsy, to live 
happily ever after. 
So ends the faery story, with an ending that reconfirms the traditional 
order: a marriage on whose solidarity depends the political order. Recog-
nitions are crucial to the narrative outcome: Orfeo and Eurydice silently 
recognize each other; Pluto metaphorically recognizes the force of his 
word; and the steward recognizes first the harp, and then Orfeo himself. 
Recognitions are the articulations of the narrative, the moments where 
the centrifugal energies of a romance narrative are turned back upon 
themselves to lead centripetally homeward. By the end of the narrative, 
thanks to these recognitions, everyone is back where they ought right-
fully to be by “nature,” in their “proper” place.new literary history 28
The conservative happiness of this ending is precisely what has raised 
hackles of many stripes against stories of this kind. The political revolu-
tionary will reject the affirmation of the old order; and those traditions, 
both religious and secular, that identify self-knowledge with crisis and 
alienation will also reject the representation of identity wholly recovered. 
This story conserves the social order by bringing everyone back home: 
Orfeo as king, Eurydice as his wife, and the faithful steward as trusty 
subaltern. Even, or rather especially, Pluto, King of the Underworld, is 
brought within the tale’s civilized pale. The intense emotional foci of 
such stories, it could be objected, underwrite an order of “nature” that 
is simultaneously self-serving, conservative, and naïve. The young hero 
does not so much develop in these stories as show his already-formed na-
ture; this is a demonstrative story whose most obvious narrative motif of 
aventure, or chance, is in fact a decoy: the aristocratic protagonist must 
always win, by virtue of his genes in a providential universe. Narrative 
is driven most deeply by commitment to nobility of blood, which will 
show through. In order to disguise and defer that inevitable, genetically 
programmed demonstration, the narrative gives very high profile to 
disguise, chance and deferral. It does so precisely because there is no 
permanent disguise, no real chance and no sustainable deferral in this 
story. The narrative must end happily with the anagnorisis of identity 
and a societal structure reconfirmed upon that recognition.
A reading that dismisses the recognitions of Orfeo as at best sentimental 
escapist fantasy or at worst as ideologically manipulative (or both) strikes 
me as reductive. The text does indeed reaffirm the “civilized” order, and 
that order is aristocratic. In fact, however, the social ideology of Sir Orfeo 
is more complex and richer. 
True, the very circular shape of such a story, returning to beginnings 
as it does, would seem conservative. The entropic catastrophes of history 
are held at bay. Everything ends just as it had begun. Despite appear-
ances, however, the ending is not the same as the beginning: the key 
personal and political relations have now been tested.
True, the identity of Orfeo is reaffirmed. That identity is, however, 
reaffirmed only by virtue of Orfeo being prepared to abandon it un-
conditionally, and for what turns out to be a sustained, ten-year period 
of isolation and alienation. 
True, the narrative is focused on the single aristocratic male. But narra-
tives of this kind will always delineate the alliances that the central male 
needs to return to the locus of power. These alliances (here with the 
steward, with Pluto, and with Eurydice) reveal the dependencies of the 
aristocratic male. Often that dependency will reveal identities of nature 
and interest between categories otherwise presented as binary opposites, 29 cognition is recognition
such as, here, the worldly king and the king of the other world: both 
recognize the rule of fidelity, and both are susceptible to the irrational 
yet civilizing power of music, along with forest beasts. 
And true, this narrative represents the male saving the woman, con-
firming the common view of romance plots as stories of knights saving 
damsels in distress. But that motif is a decoy here: it’s rather the damsel 
who, with her silent gaze of recognition, saves the knight. 
So a particular version of the civilized order is indeed reaffirmed at 
the end, but that civilized order has been enlarged and reformed by 
underlining its dependency on, or subjection to, all that threatens it. 
At the end of this narrative we might remember a detail we were told 
at the very beginning (line 29): that Pluto is Orfeo’s grandfather. The 
civilized order has been reaffirmed by revealing the full extent of its 
dependencies and surprising genealogies. That order has also been 
reaffirmed from within its inherent social and psychological resources, 
not imposed from above by legal coercion. These are stories whose 
conservatism is reformist.
Such stories express, indeed, a deeper wisdom: that for the “civilized” 
order to maintain its balance, it must have commerce with, and enter 
into, everything that threatens it. Mere resistance only more acutely ex-
poses vulnerability. Such narratives can be said to be cybernetic, in the 
proper sense of “self-governing”: they model how societies can maintain 
their balance only by entering into all that challenges them, when that 
entry into the wild seems to promise nothing but oblivion. They are 
not fundamentally about ethics, but rather about the ecology of wild 
and civilized that must pertain before we can begin to talk about ethics. 
There is no analytic consciousness articulating the truths of narrative; 
neither is style significant, since story structure does all the work, and 
that story structure is designed to model the ideal structure of civilization.
The key articulations of this cybernetic narrative are, as I have said, 
moments of recognition. So, far from those moments marking mere rep-
etition, they are instead moments that open onto a future, and that lead 
back home. They also reaffirm the social structure where that structure 
is most completely integrated, as psychological, political, and ecologi-
cal systems interlock. The recognitions are marked by intense emotion: 
the couple gazes silently, knowingly, and “yerne” (avidly) at each other 
in hostile territory; the steward knocks the table over in his eagerness 
to embrace his recovered lord. Recognition moments are marked not 
only by intense emotion, but also by complete cognitive understanding 
of a situation: the couple knowingly need say nothing, and the court 
“that this was Orfeo underyete [understood].” In these moments of 
recognition, emotion and cognition themselves interlock at high pitch.new literary history 30
II
In sum, to dismiss such apparently simple stories as either naïve or 
“conservative” is to dismiss a great deal. It is, indeed, to miss a great 
deal, since the simplicity is deceptive, and the conservatism by no means 
inert. The story is reformist rather than reactionary; through recogni-
tion, it opens back onto, and reinvigorates, a desired and recuperable 
world. Regardless of whether or not the reader is sympathetic to such 
represented recognitions, the deeper point, to which I now turn, is this: 
the experience of reading such stories by their own grain is itself depen-
dent on recognition.5 As we read, we are always looking for the familiar 
face or feature, or topos (that is, commonplace) from the past. To read 
this or any work well, we need to understand how such works operate, 
what kinds of meaning they habitually offer, and what kinds of mean-
ing they habitually do not offer. We need, it might be said, to recognize 
their “face.” We need, in short, to understand the workings of genre. 
Middle English scholarship eschews generic or modal clarity with 
regard to stories of this kind.6 After having remarked on the difficulty 
of defining the genre of romance, one scholar, for example, says that 
“any comprehensive survey should allow the reader freedom to form 
his own impression of the range and variety of English romance without 
imposing on the corpus preconceptions of how mode ought ideally to be 
embodied or what constitute the essential characteristics of the genre.”7 
This is good liberal encouragement to keep an open mind, in freedom, 
without prejudice, free of habit. Unfortunately, however, interpretation 
cannot successfully survive free of habit, since any hermeneutic act itself 
depends on préjugés; without assumptions about the kinds of meaning 
available in a work, or at least about what kinds of meaning we are look-
ing for, we cannot even begin to make sense of what its precise mean-
ing is.8 An artifact implies its history, and is illegible without habituated 
understanding of that history. Genre illuminates the present operations 
of a text by casting light on textual topoi (or commonplaces) we are 
habituated to recognize from past texts.  
Eschewal of hermeneutic habit fails to understand fundamental her-
meneutic necessities: before, that is, we can understand the meaning of 
any communicative act, we need to understand what kinds of meaning 
are likely to be available in that kind of communicative act. We need to 
know about the communicative act before we decode it, precisely in order 
that we can see the text’s “face,” or recognize it. This kind of cognition 
implies, paradoxically, recognition. We need, that is, to recognize the 
kind or type or genre of the communicative act before we can begin 
to understand what meanings are likely to be available in that act, let 31 cognition is recognition
alone what the precise meanings of the act are. So far from it being 
the case that presuppositions, habits, and préjugés are to be distrusted, 
our perception cannot begin to operate without them. This applies 
to the decoding of any local trope, as much as it applies to the global 
recognition of genre. 
In what remains of this section, I briefly offer graded rhetorical ex-
amples, from local to global, designed to demonstrate that we gener-
ate meaning through habitual recognitions.9 These examples are not 
restricted to the genre of romance, but each is designed to underline 
this point: without recognition of textual features drawn from our tex-
tual experience, we understand very little. The words on the page do 
not themselves offer up their meaning. We as readers need, rather, to 
supply our presuppositions about the text to make it leap into life, and 
we supply those presuppositions by recognizing what kind of text it is. 
Absent our effort to perceive unstated meaning, and to suppose intended 
meaning, all verbal signs, literary or not, remain forever cut off, floating 
helplessly as disiuncta membra in a world of perpetual unreadability. The 
words on the page, or in the conversation, do not state their meaning; 
we need to enter a circle, via recognition of general kind, before we can 
begin to interpret specificity.
I start with a single metaphor. Take Donne’s “No Man is an Iland, 
intire of itselfe.”10 Taken literally, this statement is true but uninforma-
tive: no man is, indeed, an island. The simple point of the statement 
is only perceived if we recognize the word “island” as a metaphor. And 
this simple recognition is only possible if we allow ourselves to infer an 
unspoken meaning standing behind and before the text. We do this on 
an ethical impulse, since we assume (i) that Donne is not insane; and 
(ii) that he must mean more than he says, since he wouldn’t waste our 
time with uninformative statements, and neither would he discuss islands 
in a meditation. Our recognition of the metaphor proves Donne’s point 
by soldering our relation with Donne (d. 1631) himself: we prove, once 
again, that no man is, indeed, an island. We assume that Donne’s state-
ment has what the philosopher and protopragmatist H. P. Grice called 
“implicature,” which is to say, logically unmotivated implications.11 Be-
fore we pass on from this example, we should also note that it’s we who 
decide whether or not the statement is metaphorical; there is no such 
thing as definitively denotative or metaphorical language: we decide, 
according to context, whether a communicative act is denotative or not.
My second example is that of irony. In classical and medieval rhetoric, 
irony is a subset of allegory: allegory “says one thing and means another”; 
irony “says one thing and means its opposite.” When we look to irony, we 
see the same necessity to recognize an originating intention outside and new literary history 32
prior to the text. Swift’s Modest Proposal (1729) argues that Irish babies be 
sold as food, thus simultaneously solving the problems of both famine 
and overpopulation. Swift’s “words on the page” will certainly make us 
acutely uneasy, but in themselves, taken literally, they mean only what 
they say. The peculiar mixture of social delicacy, rational argument, and 
blind viciousness in the Proposal creates unbearable strains for a reader 
committed to a literalist reading. As soon, of course, as we posit and 
then recognize an unspoken, ironic strategy, that strain is transformed 
into relief of sorts, as we recognize the civilized “face” of the text. 
With what justification do we posit that the author “means the op-
posite” of what he says? We can only do so by first positing, then testing 
the force of, an informing yet unstated meaning. We are emboldened to 
posit that unstated meaning, in whose light we recognize textual meaning, 
from our experience of satire. Once we see how effective that strategy 
would be, we tend to accept it. It’s our identification of the unstated 
meaning generating the text that transforms what the words mean into 
what the author meant by them. The bizarre locutionary force of the 
words (what they say literally) is transformed into a believable strategy 
by recognition of their illocutionary force (what we take the author to 
intend by them).12
We actively participate in the construction of meaning by trying to 
recognize the strategy behind words. Even if we identify that strategy 
wholly from within the text, with no reference outside it, we still, con-
ceptually at least, posit that strategy, or intention, as logically prior to, 
and therefore outside, the text. We are obliged, paradoxically, to enter 
(not to break out of) a circle when we interpret. We are obliged, that 
is, to lead back to intentions on the basis of meanings that have been 
accounted for by those very intentions. We need to recognize, to lead 
back to hermeneutic home after a period of alienation in a forest of 
hermeneutic uncertainty; our own moment of recognition is marked by 
that pleasurable interlock of heightened emotion and cognition. Some 
of us might dismiss romance plots as ideological, but the plot of our 
reading itself follows the trace of a romance plot. 
Having looked at two tropes (metaphor and irony), let me return to 
Sir Orfeo by way of showing how understanding a whole text via genre 
is a matter, too, of recognition.
Perception of a genre will involve a flexible combination of a variety 
of literary features: works that share a certain purpose, a certain subject 
matter, a certain length, a certain style and structure, and a certain point 
of view will be said to belong to a certain genre. Depending on the genre, 
the combinations and the presence of any one of these features will be 
more or less significant for generic understanding.13 33 cognition is recognition
Orfeo is a romance. Stories of this kind share the following characteris-
tics. They have a tripartite story structure: a state of integration, or implied 
integration, gives way to a state of disintegration, successfully undergoing 
the trials of which is the premise of reintegration. The reintegration of 
the protagonist extends to the story itself: all the apparent chances of 
the story play their part in propelling the protagonist back to his or her 
“proper” place. Every episode plays its part; for this reason story structures 
are nested, or chiastic, moving through a sequence of clearly delineated 
episodes until the protagonist is most lost and dislocated, before mov-
ing back through that same sequence as the protagonist recovers his or 
her identity. These stories end happily. That which is lost is found. The 
logic of their episodic structure is driven by the logic of the ending: the 
structure carefully defines what events, in what order, are necessary to 
achieve that happy ending. 
Such narratives evoke the irreparable disintegrations of tragedy only 
to evade them, often by near misses. Orfeo explicitly invokes tragedy by 
close, provisional resemblance with its more famous and powerful tragic 
twin, in which Orpheus looks back to lose Eurydice forever. The narrative 
content of these stories is driven by archetypal binary oppositions: for 
example, male versus female, human versus monster, castle versus forest, 
and (the master opposition) nurture versus nature. The civilized order, 
represented for the most part by the young, enters into all that threatens 
it and discovers that, by drawing on the resources of the civilized order, 
the apparently insuperable forces of the wild can in fact be managed 
and absorbed. By undergoing and overcoming the tests of the wild, the 
young regain the site of reintegration, having recouped the losses of 
history, and having set the entropic forces of history at bay, ever after.
Our knowledge of the way these stories habitually work informs our 
reading of this one. We recognize features of the story at hand because 
we know many such stories and read each as if it were, at first at any 
rate, the same story. Our préjugés about how such stories work points 
us to certain features in which we recognize how this particular story is 
working. We turn our attention to one set of variable possibilities and 
away from many others. In Orfeo we do not, that is, expect or look for 
the societal catastrophes of tragedy; the irredeemable personal losses 
of elegy; or the mordant laughter of satire. The concept of genre en-
codes and compacts a tightly bound, exceptionally generative nexus of 
subconcepts. Recognition of salient, persuasive meaning always involves 
rescue from the potentially random and infinite play of signifiers. Already-
existing knowledge of how genre works produces that recognition, since 
it points us to textual features that have already, many times, worked 
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act. By those known features we recognize the salient “face” of this act. 
Orfeo recognizes Eurydice; we recognize Sir Orfeo. 
Recognition of the “face” of a text is often sudden in its transforma-
tive illumination. To be sure, many separate figures of speech in a text 
point us backward: the very etymology of “verse” turns us backwards, 
just as rhyme, alliteration, anaphora. and chiasmus are, for example, all 
figures of repetition, turning us back even as we move forward. Literary 
appositional syntax, no less than the narrative structure of starting in the 
middle of the narrative before we move back to its origin, no less than lit-
erary allusion itself, takes us backwards as we move forwards. Each invites 
cognition through recognition, each offers forms of recapitulation. Our 
recognition of genre might involve analytical observation of these figures 
and features separately, but the moment of generic recognition, which is 
simultaneously the moment in which we recognize the individuality of a 
text, tends to be a moment: it is sudden, synthetic, transformative, and 
pleasurable rather than incremental, analytic, sequential, and arduous. 
We can only learn the rules of the generic game by playing particular 
instances of the game. Such a position is also circular: we play the game 
by the rules, but we learn the rules by playing the game. That interpre-
tive logic should be circular is, in itself, no objection whatsoever, since 
all hermeneutic activity is circular: we must work within hermeneutic 
circles, within which we understand, for example, the whole from the 
parts and the parts from the whole, the rules from the details, and the 
details from the rules.14 Of course we can make mistaken recognitions 
of a text’s “face,” but by playing the game repeatedly, we become better 
players. That generic mixing and nesting should be predominant in one 
period (for example, the medieval) as distinct from the fastidious generic 
clarity in another (for example, the eighteenth century) is a matter of 
deep significance for cultural history. But all periods will need to observe 
generic stability in one way or another, since interpretive understanding, 
recognizing the “face” of a text, cannot operate without it.
Such a persuasion should be fundamental to all humanistic activity, 
but especially to understanding of artifacts, whether literary, visual, or 
musical, for example, since the arts are more explicit about their need 
for interpretation, and, therefore, about generic indebtedness and 
exploitation. However much they may be susceptible of interpretation, 
neither natural phenomena nor much human behavior demands inter-
pretation. Expressive artifacts, by contrast, necessarily do communicate 
and therefore call forth interpreters. Without an understanding of genre, 
without recognition, we remain unable to answer that call. 
Knowledge derived through recognition is distinctive, insofar as it 
assumes preexistence. Unlike the triumphant discoveries by science of 35 cognition is recognition
the never-before-known, the recoveries of literary understanding are not 
original; on the contrary, we register them, afresh, as recoveries of what 
has been known and then partially, or totally, forgotten. They are like 
the “finds” of etymology, sudden illuminations of immanent truths that 
reconnect us with a long-forgotten, or at least alternative, way of thinking. 
The meeting of the preexistent in fresh circumstance is so overwhelming, 
in its force and pleasure, that it renews the already known, making “her 
old face new.” They produce the “Qual maraviglia!” of Dante’s teacher 
now in hell, as he peers through the darkness, as under a new moon, 
to recognize his former pupil. That former pupil Dante, in turn, looks 
with such penetration through the “cotto aspetto” of his teacher so that 
he, too, recognizes and names Ser Brunetto (Inferno 15.18–30). 
The surprise of this kind of literary understanding, like Brunetto 
Latini’s surprise at recognizing his former student, is never one of as-
tonishment at the wholly new. It is, instead, more like astonishment at 
the wholly surprising old; it is more like greeting a long lost parent or 
child or friend or lover or teacher or student—what you will—and being 
captured by wonder at the force of the recognition in new circumstances, 
as under the new moon. The knowledge produced by recognition is an 
invention in the older sense of the word (Latin invenire), a find rather 
than a discovery in the modern sense. It works on the assumption that 
knowledge (of this kind, at any rate) is immanent (Latin “in-manere,” to 
remain within), buried beneath the “cotto aspetto,” rather than discov-
ered outside the pale of the previously known. 
Recognition-derived perception does not, that is, provide original 
experience. It is not revolutionary. On the contrary, its recoveries radiate 
the exquisite pleasure of knowledge that illuminates precisely because 
it is not original. It offers deeply illuminating repetition in fresh circum-
stance. The illuminating truth of artistic history is embedded within his-
tory, not discovered from outside. The interpreter’s pleasure is perhaps 
comparable to the archaeologist’s: every work is a find, packed with 
histories just waiting to be revivified. Behind, or within, the literary text 
lie the treasures of the past, treasures by whose gleam, as under a new 
moon, we suddenly see our present condition afresh. Much knowledge 
produced by the humanities would by definition have been unavailable 
to its historical actors. For the knowledge that would by definition be 
available to its historical actors, recognition provides a compact model. 
III
The phenomenon of cognition through recognition is not, however, 
in any way restricted to literary understanding. It is instead rooted in new literary history 36
our broader linguistic and perceptual habits. “Implicature,” which in 
good part generated the branch of linguistics known as pragmatism, 
points to that area of meaning beyond the reach of semantics. “Where’s 
Bill?” someone might ask, to which the response might be “There’s a 
yellow VW outside Sue’s house.”15 The semantic content of the reply 
offers no response to the question; on the face of it, and by a literalist 
reading, the response is irrelevant to the question. We make these two 
statements a part of a single narrative, however, on the assumption that 
the respondent is in fact answering the question. The very appearance 
of irrelevance provokes us to hypothesize, and to recognize, relevance 
at a further level. We infer many things, in fact: that the respondent is 
sane; that the answer is relevant; that the car had transported Bill; and 
that Bill is at Sue’s house. None of these inferences is logically gener-
ated. They are, on the contrary, inferred simply from an expectation of 
conversational relevance. 
Relevance is one of Grice’s four principal maxims of conversation, 
all of which are contained under a general principle of cooperation. 
The other three are quality (do not lie), quantity (offer only as much 
information as the exchange requires), and manner (avoid obscurity or 
ambiguity, and preserve a chronological order of narration). Readers 
familiar with classical and medieval poetic treatises will be amused at 
these maxims, since those treatises encouraged writers to break almost 
each one of them. Grice, however, absorbs literary language by showing 
how flouting the maxims continues to produce inferred meaning. These 
inferences are testimony to the “remarkable robustness of the assumption 
of co-operation: if someone drastically and dramatically deviates from 
maxim-type behavior, then his utterances are still read as underlyingly 
co-operative if this is at all possible.”16 Donne’s “no man is an island” 
flouts the maxim of relevance to observe with especial force the maxim 
of quantity, offering a great deal of information in a very short space.
It might be objected that the literary examples discussed in the previ-
ous section are rather special cases, and that a good deal of everyday 
language is fairly clear, unambiguous, and self-sufficient. I don’t think 
this is true at all. Grice generated his theory of “implicature” out of the 
practice of conversation; he reveals that any conversational exchange 
relies on a complex and dense exchange of implicatures surrounding 
the semantic content of the conversation. Consider the following con-
versation between me and my daughter age six. She holds in her hand 
a red, wooden elephant. The conversation follows thus:
Father: What is it?
Daughter: It’s red.
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Daughter: It’s wooden.
Father: Yes, but what is it?
Daughter: It’s a gift.
Father (now fascinated): Yes, but what is it?
Daughter: It’s an elephant.
I found this exchange both funny and illuminating, precisely because 
my daughter’s unwitting flouting of the rules of conversation revealed to 
me how arbitrary those rules are. Needless to say, I expected the answer 
“elephant” to my first question; what I received instead was a series of 
true statements, each of which understood “is” to denote an entirely 
different quality of the object. Because my daughter had not been ha-
bituated into the conceptual hierarchy whereby we give priority to thing 
denoted, she used the word “is” more literally than would have been the 
case had she answered my question as first expected. That is to say, the 
wooden toy was in fact more accurately described as red, wooden, and a 
gift than as an elephant. My daughter “failed” to recognize a preexistent 
consensus concerning the word “is,” and so “failed” to recognize what 
kind of conversation I expected of her. She had clearly absorbed three 
of Grice’s maxims (quality, quantity, and manner), but not entirely the 
fourth, relevance. She could only have absorbed this maxim by practice, 
since its application is purely arbitrary.
An example such as this challenges any easy separation of literary and 
ordinary language on the grounds of complexity.17 How, all our linguistic 
examples (both literary and “ordinary”) demand of us, do we get from 
what a statement means to what a speaker or writer means by it? Within 
any text (however one understands that term) we need to interpret the 
part by the whole, and the whole by the part, and we account for mean-
ings of both parts and whole on the basis of evidence whose meanings we 
have already inferred from both parts and whole. In all communicative 
situations our hermeneutic thinking is circular; we posit a face of the 
communicative act in order to recognize its meaning. 
Neither is such an account of perception limited to verbal perception. 
All our senses organize and make sense of the world through recogni-
tions. This is clearly a huge topic, so let one beautifully succinct example 
suffice to point us towards our broader perceptual habits: 
The key features of our psychological response to this amusing and 
classic image are as follows: we cannot see lively duck and humble rabbit 
simultaneously; it’s we who decide what to see; and, as we decide what 
to see on the basis of our own, produced recognition of duck or rabbit, 
we organize our perception differently.18 The eye remains an eye as the 
focus of our recognition, but every other principal mark serves differ-
ent purposes according to the viewer’s decision. Rabbit’s ears become new literary history 38
duck’s beak according to what we decide to recognize, and what features 
we decide to demote.19 We also experience this same psychological 
phenomenon whenever we unsuccessfully look for something with the 
wrong mental image: if we look for the book with the green spine using 
the mistaken mental image that the spine in question is blue, we can 
“see” the green-spined book any number of times without recognizing 
that this is the book for which we are in fact looking. We truly see only 
what we recognize. As for machines taught face and voice recognition, 
so too for humans: perception is preception.
Recognition, then, characterizes literary interpretation no less than 
the very much wider fields of linguistic and sense-derived interpretation 
generally. Despite that fact, at least three influential discursive fields 
in Western culture must, with powerful reason, maintain the fiction 
that recognition has no part to play in reading and perception. These 
fields must maintain the fiction of positivism, that the real world datum 
comes first and that the real world datum is the only source of truth, 
from which follows understanding. Such powerful currents, which are 
understood as the default, common-sense position of our society, must 
therefore continue to describe the action of interpretive recognition 
pejoratively, as prejudice. 
Those three fields are as follows: Protestant biblical interpretation; 
scientific enquiry; and constitutional interpretation in revolutionary 
societies grounded on a written constitution. Each of these fields must 
Fig. 1. 39 cognition is recognition
strictly deny that an interpreter should recognize the truths of the object 
of enquiry by positing logically unmotivated meanings. Each field must 
instead posit (in the textual examples) that the entire meaning of a 
text is contained in its words, or (in the case of science) that the entire 
meaning of a natural object derives from the object itself. Such fields 
therefore maintain that we should restrict ourselves to those meanings 
derived wholly from the words on the page, or from the object under 
enquiry. To engage dialectically in the production of meaning is, for 
each of these traditions, to exercise prejudice. Each will also, not coinci-
dentally, actively posit that there is such a thing as the literal sense, and 
each will repudiate figural, or tropical, language of any kind. 
Positivist traditions will surface within particular historical environ-
ments. The most powerful historical environment is, in my view, the 
sixteenth-century Protestant Reformation, for which text’s absolute pri-
ority to institution was a nonnegotiable necessity. For sixteenth-century 
evangelical polemicists, Scripture had to precede Church, since it was 
Scriptural authority that determined the Church, rather than the other 
way around. Scripture, therefore, had to be both incontrovertible and 
straightforward. Scripture had also, therefore, to be literal. The existence 
of figurative language (for example, allegory) implied the need for an 
expert body of readers with understanding of how to recognize the 
meaning of the text in ways not explicitly directed by the text.20 
The Scientific Revolution that began in the seventeenth century pos-
ited that things and ideas were absolutely prior to words, and that words 
should be tailored in strict, denotational subservience to those things 
and ideas, avoiding all figural language whatsoever.21 
And the late eighteenth-century revolutionary societies (the United 
States and France, for example) imagined that they were brought into 
being by constitutional documents. Text was, therefore, absolutely prior 
to communal understandings of text, and text is therefore to be under-
stood without prior experience of the protocols within which that text 
was produced. The truths of text are held to be self-evident; text brings 
society into being, rather than the other way around. And text is to be 
shorn of figural language. 
The psychological correlative of all these revolutionary cultures is an 
empiricist account of the psyche as a blank slate on which the world 
is impressed and thereafter understood. Both history and the psyche 
start from scratch. 
The default positions, textual and psychological, of revolutionary societ-
ies will label preexistent persuasions about meaning as prejudice. They 
will actively repudiate the preexistent ideas of both Platonism and one 
of its derivatives, late antique Christianity, for both of which recollection 
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Psychological empiricism will also repudiate figural language, since 
decoding metaphor or irony (for example) presupposes presupposition.
Textual positivism and its correlative, psychological empiricism, might 
seem to avoid the strongest rational objection to the account of recol-
lective, recognitional interpretation given above. It might seem, that is, 
to void the objection that such interpretation is circular. The meaning 
arrived at when we decode figural language or genre is, as we have seen, 
the one that generated the interpretative process in the first place. Or, 
to put it slightly less baldly, we generate our understanding of the mean-
ing of a text on the basis of evidence whose meaning we have already 
recognized from that very text. Positivism promises to break out of that 
circularity. According to this tradition, as E. D. Hirsch has argued, the 
Pauline dictum is reversed: “the spirit killeth, but the letter giveth life.”23
Textual positivism, however, vastly impoverishes our understanding. 
Within its terms, we cannot move from what the words of a text mean 
to what an author meant by them. Positivism is also hopelessly equipped 
to cope in linguistic situations where complete clarity is not possible. A 
constitution, by definition, speaks from a position of assumed power, 
and therefore assumes itself able to avoid linguistic obliquity. Literary 
authors of many kinds, on the contrary, are often obliged or predisposed 
to adopt linguistic subterfuges. Positivism is, further, massively unde-
requipped to meet the complexities of social existence more generally, 
since we necessarily inhabit a world in which expressions do not, and 
cannot, say what they mean. All human forms of communication, in 
whatever discursive field, say one thing and potentially mean something 
else. For the most part we are able to forget this, participating in systems 
of communication that are shored up by deeply ingrained conventional 
habits of unspoken agreement. Textual interpreters of literary, legal, 
and biblical texts, whose meanings are subject to powerful competitive 
forces claiming different meanings, are, however, unable to forget the 
fragility of the literal sense, and unable to forget the need for interpre-
tative recognition.
By contrast with the textual default positions of revolutionary cultures 
and their attendant empiricism, literary knowledge must entertain préju-
gés. Understanding text is dependent on recognition of the text’s long 
prehistory, compacted into the deep coding of genre. At the heart of our 
reading practice, that is, stands not the revolutionary discovery of the 
never before known, but rather the reformist recovery of the somehow 
already known. That recovery always feels new; it has the capacity to 
bathe the reader in the sense of a freshly discovered perception so as to 
produce a sense of Dante’s “qual maraviglia!” For all that, the discovery 
itself is better described as a re-cognition, a marvelous uncovering of 
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IV
My essay is coming to a close. I began with the representation of 
recognition in the apparently simple romance Orfeo, in discussion of 
which I mounted two arguments. In the first place, I sought to change 
the mind of those who would dismiss such recognitions as “conservative.” 
These recognitions, I argued, were never merely repetitions: they are 
indeed conservative, retrospective as they are, but the conservatism is 
self-reforming, since the nonrepetitive recognitions take their participants 
by reformist surprise. The backward look propels the narrative and its 
actors forward. In the second place, I argued that, regardless of whether 
one might, or might not, sympathize with the recognitions of romance, 
nonrepetitive recognitions are in any case a fundamental characteristic 
of our interpretive cognition. As readers we deploy re-cognition to take 
us out of the forest of hermeneutic uncertainty, back home to fresh 
understanding of the already known. In that forest of uncertainty, after, 
possibly, many half-recognitions, we fully recognize the “face” of the text, 
as if under a new moon. Such recognition leads us home. 
Let me end, however, with a refined model of the reading practice 
just articulated. The model so far proposed would have it that, via her-
meneutic recognition, we return home to full identification with the 
text in hand. But that model must fall short, since many (probably all) 
of us will be unable to identify with, say, the aristocratic, male-centered 
civilizational model of Orfeo. We can be thrilled by recognizing the text’s 
subtle “face”; we might sympathize with that old face made new. But 
identify with it? No. A better model, with which I end, might be the 
frequent topos of the otherworldly recognition in which the embrace of 
the recognized loved one is in vain. Such recognitions supply us with an 
even sharper model for our own literary experience: we are immeasur-
ably enlivened by reaching towards the recognized loved one, even as 
we are painfully deluded by her or his absence.
Dante’s Commedia is the great example of a text whose entire narrative 
of self-knowledge, from dark forest to lucid paradise, is driven by a com-
plex interaction of recognitions and painful leave takings. The recogni-
tion registers the profound indebtedness to the figure from the past; the 
necessity of leave taking registers the often cruel but ineluctable primacy 
of the present. The overall pattern produces immense, transformative 
energy for the future. We have observed two such recognitions already 
in this essay: that of Dante and his teacher Brunetto Latini, and that of 
Dante and Beatrice. In each case Dante must leave a beloved teacher, 
whether Brunetto or Virgil, in the half world of shades, even as Dante 
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Behind those repeated, enlivening recognitions and painful sever-
ances stand classical examples of the failed gaze and/or embrace. 
These vain embraces derive from an intense desire for identification, 
but produce a more intense consciousness of loss. Take, for example, 
the shadow text for the comic, medieval romance with which I began, 
the classical, tragic myth of Orpheus and Eurydice. Orpheus’s longing 
for his lost wife propels him, in Virgil’s narration, even unto and into 
the underworld, where the beauty of his music enchants the souls from 
the depths of Hades, the bodiless shades and simulacra lacking light.24 
Leading Eurydice from the depths, on the very edge of light (“iam luce 
sub ipsa” [Georgics 4.490]), Orpheus falls victim to the sudden lapse of 
desire and turns back to seek Eurydice’s mutual gaze, only to lose her 
forever among the umbrae tenues. Both seek vainly to embrace each other, 
but find only shadows. 
Just as Ser Brunetto’s recognition of his former pupil Dante occurs 
in a beautiful half-light (as if “sotto nuova luna”), so too the force of 
Orpheus’s recognition is intensified by occurring on the very edge of 
light. The other vain embraces of classical literature also occur in un-
usual lighting: Ulysses recognizes his mother in the half-light of Hades 
(Odyssey 11.155). Aeneas recognizes the shade of his recently dead wife 
Creusa in the night scene of Troy under attack, illuminated by lurid 
and destructive fire (Aeneid 2.752–95). And Anchises recognizes his son 
Aeneas in Hades as he surveys the souls that will advance to the light 
(“ad lumen ituras,” 6.680). The strange light conditions facilitate, or 
perhaps produce, the cognitive illumination and emotional power of 
the meetings: in each the shade informs the full-bodied loved one as to 
either past or future; and in each case the encounter is highly charged 
emotionally: Ulysses poignantly tries three times to embrace his mother 
(Odyssey 11.206); three times does Aeneas attempt to embrace his wife’s 
prophetic shade, which evades him as would a winged dream, “volucri   
. . . simillima somno” (Aeneid 2.794); and three times does Aeneas seek 
vainly to embrace his father’s evanescent shade, “volucri . . . simillima 
somno” (Aeneid 6.702). 
In each case these recognitions bear all the transformative cognitive 
and emotional force of seeing the past so as to make her old face new. 
Unlike the recognitions of Sir Orfeo with which we began, however, 
each of these propels the living into a creative future through a sense 
of intense loss.  
Literary knowledge, in sum, is distinctive; it’s dialectical; and it depends 
as much on what is already known by the reader as on what’s new in the 
text. Without a knowing reader capable of recognizing textual “face,” 
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experience of recognizing textual face sometimes as romance (promising 
plenitude), sometimes as elegy (premised on loss). Whether promising 
plenitude or premised on loss, the recognized textual face is not in any 
way the experience of a radical, Levinasian alterity; on the contrary, 
our recognition of textual face implies, and realizes, a transformative 
affective claim we make on that known face.
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